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Abstract
A standard “solution” oﬀered to the deleterious eﬀects of all-out price com-
petition is for ﬁrms to engage in diﬀerentiation strategies. This solution, how-
ever, depends critically on the inability of rivals to imitate a successful diﬀer-
entiation strategy. With imitation, we show how “Red Queen” pricing eﬀects
can arise: All ﬁrms have an incentive to vertically diﬀerentiate and increase
m a r k u p s ,y e ti m i t a t i o nb yr i v a l sd r i v e sp r i c e sd o w nt o w a r dp r e - d i ﬀerentiation
levels. Thus, the price premia arising from diﬀerentiation strategies in e-
retailing critically depend on the number of other ﬁrms that imitate the strate-
gies. Based on data from Shopper.com, we ﬁnd that an online ﬁrm that uni-
laterally diﬀerentiates itself from its rivals by participating in CNet’s Certiﬁed
Merchant program enjoys a 5 to 17 percent price premium. However, when
other ﬁrms also follow this strategy, the price premium vanishes.
JEL Numbers: D4, D8, M3, L13.
Keywords: Pricing, Product Diﬀerentiation, Red Queen Eﬀect,
Internet, Reputation
1“Now HERE you see, it takes all the running YOU can do, to keep in the
same place. If you want to get somewhere, you must run at least twice as
fast as that.” –The Red Queen speaking to Alice in Through the Looking
Glass, Lewis Carroll.
1 Introduction
Ellison and Ellison (2001) suggest that competition at price comparison sites and the
resulting commoditization of the products being oﬀered by E-retailers will likely give
rise to prices being driven to marginal cost. Faced with such a stark competitive envi-
ronment, the standard prescription of business strategy guides, such as Information
Rules by Shapiro and Varian (1998), is for E-retailers to look for opportunities to
diﬀerentiate themselves from their rivals as much as possible and thereby avoid the
commoditization of these markets and the resultant “Bertrand Trap.” While this is
sound advice, can diﬀerentiation, by itself, enable ﬁrms to avoid the commoditization
of these markets? Harder still, even if a ﬁrm is successful, can it avoid imitation by
other ﬁrms?
In answering these questions, it is important to note that the intermediary operat-
ing the price comparison site also has an incentive to facilitate diﬀerentiation. After
all, if prices are driven to marginal cost, there is little incentive for consumers to use
t h es i t et os e a r c ho u tt h el o w e s tp r i c ea n dh e n c e ,t h ev a l u eo ft h es i t ei sd i m i n i s h e d
with the commoditization of e-retail markets (see Baye and Morgan, 2001 and Baye,
Morgan, and Scholten, 2003). One way intermediaries on the Internet strive to facil-
itate diﬀerentiation among E-retailers is by creating mechanisms whereby ﬁrms can
2advertise their service levels. The primary focus of this paper is to study how diﬀer-
entiation through a particular intermediary sponsored mechanism, the CNet Certiﬁed
Merchant Program, aﬀected retail prices listed on the Internet price comparison site,
Shopper.com, and how imitation aﬀects the premium ﬁrms might otherwise charge
t h r o u g hs u c hd i ﬀerentiation strategies.
We show that ﬁrms’ incentives to vertically diﬀe r e n t i a t ec r e a t ew h a tw er e f e rt o
as “Red Queen” pricing eﬀects in E-retail markets: In many online environments, it
takes all the vertical diﬀerentiation an E-retailer can do just to keep prices in the same
place. That is, each ﬁrm has a sharp incentive to provide a higher level of service
than rivals and charge the associated price premium, but, when rivals imitate, the
resulting competition pushes prices back down to pre-diﬀerentiation levels. Analogous
situations have been documented by van Valen (1973) in the context of evolutionary
biology. For example, evolutionary selection favors trees that grow taller to enjoy more
sunlight, but ultimately results in a forest with taller trees — all of which enjoy the
same amount of sunlight. Thus, each tree has an incentive to “vertically diﬀerentiate”
(i.e., grow taller), yet with imitation, no tree gains any advantage over its rivals.
In the next section, we identify a class of vertical diﬀerentiation games that ex-
hibit Red Queen pricing eﬀects. Roughly, our Proposition 1 shows that these eﬀects
arise in E-retail environments where relative service plays an important role in con-
sumer choice. In this case, an E-retailer might attempt to increase its relative service
quality through its eﬀorts to build a reputation, by streamlining the ordering and
3shipping process, by providing additional customer service in the form of extensions
of manufacturer warranties or generous return policies, and so on. The incentive to
do so is clear: A ﬁrm unilaterally establishing such a position obtains a competitive
advantage over its rivals–especially in fairly commoditized markets such as those on
Shopper.com. However, other ﬁrms have similar incentives: When it is feasible for
other ﬁrms to imitate and increase their own service qualities, it is optimal to do
so. Of course, the situation where many ﬁrms provide similar service levels–that is,
when multiple ﬁrms are CNet certiﬁed–leads to prices that are no higher than those
prevailing in the absence of certiﬁcation (although overall sales may be higher due
to heightened consumer conﬁdence in making online purchases). In short, the price
competition among ﬁrms oﬀering similar levels of service drives prices down toward
initial levels, and the prediction is that no premium is associated with becoming CNet
certiﬁed.
To examine the role of vertical diﬀerentiation and imitation on pricing — and in
particular to test whether there is any evidence of Red Queen pricing eﬀects in E-
retail markets — we collected monthly data on a ﬁxed set of 36 consumer electronics
products sold at the price comparison site, Shopper.com, over the eighteen month
period from 5 November 1999 through 5 May 2001. Since the pool of products in our
sample diﬀer in terms of both the nature and stage of their product life cycles, we
obtain price variation that permits us to disentangle the impact of various strategies
and market fundamentals on the pricing decisions of ﬁrms in online markets. Product
4and ﬁrm turnover give rise to an unbalanced panel of data consisting of 9,435 daily
price observations. A wide variety of product types are tracked, including add-on
hardware components, personal digital assistants, and software.
How valuable is this diﬀerentiation? In markets where many ﬁrms are CNet
certiﬁed, we ﬁnd no diﬀerence in the prices charged by certiﬁed merchants. The
competition among ﬁrms with service qualities that are perceived to be equal tends
to once again commoditize the market and eliminates the ability of ﬁrms to use that
mechanism to gain a competitive advantage. On the other hand, when a ﬁrm is
one of only a few ﬁrms that are certiﬁed merchants, the situation is dramatically
diﬀerent. A seller who is the only CNet certiﬁed merchant for a particular product
typically is able to charge 5 percent higher prices than its rivals. When a CNet
certiﬁed merchant competes against one or more other CNet certiﬁed merchants, the
premium essentially vanishes. Thus, we ﬁnd empirical evidence that this particular
diﬀerentiation mechanism essentially induces Red Queen pricing eﬀects.
Our study contributes to a growing literature that generally ﬁnds that vertical
diﬀerentiation does not permit ﬁrms to charge substantial price premia. For in-
stance, Baylis and Perloﬀ (2002) ﬁnd no evidence that ﬁrms oﬀering “superior ser-
vice” charge price premiums for two brands of digital cameras and ﬂatbed scanners
sold at CNet.com. More generally, Pan, Ratchford and Shankar (2003) ﬁnd that
third party certiﬁcation of service quality has no impact on E-retail prices. While
Smith and Brynjolfsson (2001) and Clay et al. (2002) oﬀer some evidence that Ama-
5zon and other heavily branded book retailers charge price premiums of about $1.72
over generic sellers, the latter authors hint that even these small premiums may be
“temporary.”1 Likewise, there is little evidence that more reputable sellers in online
auctions sell products at higher prices than their less reputable rivals.2 Our model of
Red Queen pricing eﬀects oﬀers a theoretical rationale for these empirical ﬁndings.
Further, consistent with the view expressed in Clay, et al., Red Queen pricing eﬀects
p r e d i c tt h a tv e r t i c a ld i ﬀerentiation can (and does) lead to transitory price premia in
these markets, but these premia vanish with imitation by other ﬁrms. Indeed, this is
the main ﬁnding to come out of our data.
One should not view our results as evidence that diﬀerentiation is never as u s -
tainable strategy. It is well documented in the economics and marketing literatures
that horizontal and vertical diﬀerentiation can — in the presence of suﬃciently costly
imitation–lead to a sustainable competitive advantage.3 The point is that when
imitation is not very costly and when relative service quality is important–as is the
1The authors note on page 366: “The premium that Amazon was able to command relative
to Barnesandnoble.com and Borders.com suggests that it had succeeded in (at least temporarily)
diﬀerentiating its product.”
2See Resnick and Zeckhauser (2002), Livingston (2003), and Bolton, Katok and Ockenfels (2003)
for a discussion of the related auction literature, and for insights into the utility of user feedback
ratings in auction markets on the Internet as well as in laboratory settings.
3For instance, Sarvary (1999) shows how ﬁrms can use online markets to leverage brand loyalty
and enjoy higher proﬁts. Lynch and Ariely (2000) and Clemons, Hann, and Hitt (2002) suggest that
horizontal diﬀerentiation can be used as a tool to mitigate the price competition inherent in online
markets ranging from wine to air travel.
6case in the E-retail environments in our study and the studies described above–Red
Queen pricing eﬀects result.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 formally deﬁnes Red
Queen pricing eﬀects, establishes theoretical conditions under which they arise, and
shows that they are particularly likely to arise in E-retail settings such as Shop-
per.com where ﬁrms make binary decisions to gain CNet certiﬁcation or not. Section
3 describes our data and the institutional setting at Shopper.com, while Section 4
presents econometric results and tests for the presence of Red Queen pricing eﬀects.
Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2T h e o r y
This section formally deﬁnes what we call “Red Queen pricing eﬀects,” and identiﬁes
conditions under which these eﬀects arise in E-retail environments. We also provide
a numerical example that illustrates our results and highlights testable implications
for pricing patterns observed at Shopper.com.
Consider an online market where n ﬁrms compete for consumers. While there are
many dimensions in which these ﬁrms might attempt to diﬀerentiate themselves from
rivals, suppose that, in the relevant planning horizon, the only endogenous dimension
in which ﬁrms can diﬀerentiate is through service levels. Thus, while ﬁrms might
sell products that consumers view as either diﬀerentiated or homogeneous, ﬁrms can
attempt to inﬂuence consumer purchase decisions by enhancing the level of service
7(denoted si)o ﬀered to consumers. Higher levels of service (such as more timely
shipping or liberal return policies) are associated with higher values of si, while the
minimum service level required to operate in the market is s0 > 0.
Thus, a strategy for ﬁrm i consists of a price pi ∈ <+ and a service level si ≥ s0.
Let p−i and s−i denote the vectors of pricing and service levels selected by ﬁrms
other than i,a n dl e tﬁrm i’s proﬁts be denoted πi (pi,p −i,s i,s −i). We assume the
proﬁt functions are “well behaved” (that is, satisfy the usual continuity/concavity
assumptions required for the existence of an interior Nash equilibrium), and that
price and service are strategic complements (∂2πi/∂pi∂si > 0).
In the sequel, we consider two environments. In the ﬁrst, the service levels of all
ﬁrms are set exogenously at the minimum level, s0, and ﬁrms simply compete in price.
Let p0 denote a price charged by each ﬁrm in a symmetric Nash equilibrium in this
environment. In the second, service levels are determined endogenously, and ﬁrms
simultaneously compete in price and service. Let (p∗,s ∗) denote the price and service
level chosen by each ﬁrm in a symmetric Nash equilibrium in this environment.
With this notation, we are in a position to formally deﬁne Red Queen pricing
eﬀects.
Deﬁnition 1 A market satisfying the following two conditions is said to exhibit Red
Queen pricing eﬀects:
(i) Suppose all ﬁrms other than i adopt price and service levels (p0,s 0).T h e nﬁrm
i can gain by unilaterally raising its price to pi >p 0 and its service level to si >s 0.
8(ii) Suppose all ﬁrms optimally adjust prices and service levels to symmetric Nash
equilibrium levels, (p∗,s ∗).T h e np∗ = p0 and s∗ >s 0.
Part (i) of the deﬁnition says that when rivals oﬀer low service levels and price
optimally, an innovating ﬁrm can gain by raising its service level and capture the
resulting value created by charging a premium price. Part (ii) says that the strategic
response of other ﬁrms leads to rational imitation. In equilibrium, all ﬁrms raise
their service levels, but no ﬁrm can capture the resulting value created by charging a
premium price. Our main proposition establishes suﬃcient conditions for Red Queen
pricing eﬀects to arise in online markets.
Proposition 1 Suppose (p∗,s ∗) is a Nash equilibrium in which, for all i, πi (pi,p −i,s i,s −i)=
φ(pi,p −i,s i,s −i)+h(p−i,s i,s −i); φ is homogeneous of degree zero in (si,s −i) and
strictly increasing in si; and ∂h(p−i,s 0,s −i)/∂si =0 . Then the market exhibits Red
Queen pricing eﬀects.
Proof. First, notice that, given p−i, and s−i, ﬁrm i’s optimal price and service level
















To show that part (i) of Deﬁnition 1 holds, ﬁx si = s0 for all i and suppose ﬁrms only









9since p0 is a symmetric equilibrium of the game where service levels are exogenously
















where the inequality follows from strict concavity and the fact that pi and si are
strategic complements.































/∂si =0and the in-
equality follows from the fact that φ is strictly increasing in si.
To show that part (ii) of Deﬁnition 1 holds, notice that, since the proﬁt functions
are symmetric, there exists a symmetric equilibrium where all ﬁrms choose identical
pure strategies, (p∗,s ∗). Further, there exists a λ>0 such that s∗ = λs0.


































10Therefore, if p0 is an equilibrium price when all ﬁrms have service level s0,i ti sa l s oa n
equilibrium price charged by all ﬁrms in a symmetric Nash equilibrium where service
levels are endogenously determined. This completes the proof.
To illustrate the role that relative service levels play in generating Red Queen
pricing eﬀects, consider the following extreme case where higher service levels merely
shift market share from one ﬁrm to another. Speciﬁcally, consider a duopoly market
where ﬁrms compete in a standard diﬀerentiated products Bertrand setting. Suppose
the market demand for ﬁrm i is given by
Di = K − pi + δpj,
where K = L +
si
si+sjM and δ ∈ (0,1). Firms have constant marginal cost, c<L ,of
selling the good, and the cost of providing service level si is quadratic: τ (si − s0)
2,
where τ>0. Thus, ﬁrm i’s proﬁts are given by











Notice that we may rewrite this proﬁtf u n c t i o ni nt h ef o r m :
πi (pi,p j,s i,s j)=φ(pi,p j,s i,s j)+h(si),




si+sjM − pi + δpj
´
and h = −τ (si − s0)
2 . This proﬁtf u n c -
tion satisﬁes the conditions in Proposition 1; therefore, one may conclude that the
market will exhibit Red Queen pricing eﬀects. In this simple example, only relative
service levels impact a ﬁrm’s demand and this leads to a “prisoner’s dilemma” situa-
tion for each ﬁrm. That is, each ﬁrm has an incentive to boost service in an attempt
11to gain market share, but the other ﬁrm does likewise, and, consequently, prices are
driven down to the same level as when both ﬁrms oﬀered only minimal service levels.
It is important to stress that, while the above example illustrates the polar case
where service levels only have the eﬀect of stealing market share from rivals, Proposi-
tion 1 shows that Red Queen pricing eﬀects also arise in more general settings where
service levels do have demand-enhancing eﬀects. All that is required is that there be
additive separability between market-share eﬀects (denoted by the φ term in Propo-
sition 1) and other eﬀects, including demand-enhancing eﬀects (which are contained
in the h term in Proposition 1).
With an eye toward the analysis of the data in the sequel, it is also useful to
note that Red Queen pricing eﬀects identiﬁed here can also arise when the set of
feasible service levels is discrete. To see this, suppose the payoﬀs are as in equation
(1), but suppose ﬁrms’ service level decisions are binary, i.e. si ∈ {s0,s 1}, where
s1 >s 0. This setting approximates the institutional environment we examine in the
next section; s1 is the level of service required for a merchant at Shopper.com to
obtain CNet certiﬁcation, while s0 is the minimal service level required to list prices
at Shopper.com.
























Since p0 = p∗, condition (ii) for Red Queen pricing eﬀects is satisﬁed, and there is no
price premium charged when both ﬁrms are CNet certiﬁed.
When ﬁrm j is not certiﬁed (sj = s0), it is optimal for ﬁrm i to become certiﬁed











































































Thus, condition (i) for Red Queen pricing eﬀe c t si sa l s os a t i s ﬁed, and the single
certiﬁed ﬁrm enjoys a higher markup.
In short, this example suggests that market environments such as those at Shop-
per.com are likely to exhibit Red Queen pricing eﬀects. Controlling for other factors,















However, this premium vanishes if both ﬁrms opt to become CNet certiﬁed.
3 Data Description
Our analysis is based on monthly data on 36 of the best-selling consumer electronics
products sold at Shopper.com between 5 November 1999 and 5 May 2001. Shop-
per.com is a price comparison site that provides consumers with a list of sellers (and
their prices) for fairly expensive consumer electronics products. For instance, con-
sider a consumer who wanted to purchase a Palm V personal digital assistant on 5
November 1999. A visit to Shopper.com and a simple mouse click returned a list of
48 diﬀerent ﬁrms that sell this product, for prices ranging from a low of $278.89 and a
high of $415.00. The resulting list also provides a variety of information about seller
characteristics, such as shipping costs, product availability, and whether the vendor
is “CNet certiﬁed.” Shopper.com is a high-traﬃcs i t ew i t ha na c t i v eu s e rb a s et h a t
translates into many leads for its seller network.4
We selected the top 36 products, based on CNet’s rankings on 5 November 1999,
4According to Nielsen NetRatings on January 2002, Shopper.com’s U.S. user base accesses 4
million page views daily. These page views generated 85,000 daily leads, where a lead is deﬁned as
14a n dt h e nd o w n l o a d e dt h er e l e v a n ti n f o r m a t i o no nt h e5 t ho fe a c hm o n t ht h e r e a f t e r
through 5 May 2001. Thus, in contrast to more recent data analyzed by Baye,
Morgan, and Scholten (2003), in this study we track a ﬁxed set of products. Over
t h ee n t i r ep e r i o d ,1 9 0d i ﬀerent ﬁrms sold one or more of these 36 products at some
point during the period. The prices and number of sellers for each product obviously
varied over the period. Thus, these data capture products at various stages of their
life cycles.
Table 1 provides a summary of the products covered, and some summary statistics.
As indicated, the sample includes (at the time) popular software titles, PDAs, digital
cameras, and other computer hardware components and peripherals. These products
range in price from a daily average of $18.55 to over $700. Thus, a wide array of
products is sampled that likely appeal to a large number of consumers with diverse
demographic backgrounds. Notice that the number of sellers and the number of dates
in which the products were sold varies across product markets. On the low end of the
spectrum, the market for an upgrade version of Windows 98 is very thin: There is
a single merchant in each of three months that this software was listed. In contrast,
the market for a Nikon Coolpix 950 camera is thick. On average, there are about 50
merchants listing prices for this camera, and this product was listed on all 19 months
in our sample. More generally, the average product in our sample sold for about $200,
when a user clicks-through to a merchant’s site from a Cnet site. Moreover, according to internal
company research, Cnet’s audience is six times more likely than the average Web user to purchase
hardware items online.
15was sold by about 16 ﬁrms, and was available on 15 of the 19 months we sampled.
Of the 36 products tracked, over two-thirds were sold by at least 10 merchants. We
note that product life-cycle eﬀects led to some products not being listed toward the
end of our study. While all 36 of the products shown in Table 1 were available on 5
November 1999, by the end of our study only 10 of these products were listed for sale
at Shopper.com.
During the period studied, consumers could access all of the information provided
by Shopper.com at no charge. However, merchants had to pay to become a member
of the Shopper.com merchant network. This entailed a one-time setup fee of $1,000,
plus a monthly fee of $100 and sliding scale of click-through fees on the order of $.40
per click. In addition, we note that merchants input their own prices each day, and
must also input detailed product information for each product, such as the product
manufacturer name and exact SKU. This guarantees that products listed on a single
page are physically identical. Merchants must also provide a URL link to the product
page so that users can easily click through to the merchant’s site and obtain further
product information. While merchants are not required to disclose shipping cost and
product availability data, merchants can optionally display this information. Finally,
at the time of our study, Shopper.com required that the price input by ﬁrms represent
the actual price charged on a credit-card purchase for a new product (not used or
reconditioned), and these prices must be exclusive of any rebates.
During the period we study, the primary way merchants in the Shopper.com
16network could diﬀerentiate themselves was by participating in the “CNet Certiﬁed
Merchant” program. To be designated as a CNet Certiﬁed Merchant, a ﬁrm subjects
itself to audits to guarantee that it provides accurate inventory and shipping cost
information; provides CNet with a customer service policy and posts this information
at its website; honors displayed prices; uses an encryption technology that securely
processes online transactions; provides order conﬁrmation within one business day;
provides professional packaging; and responds to any consumer correspondence within
two business days.
Table 2 provides summary statistics for certiﬁed merchants and non-certiﬁed mer-
chants for each of the products in our sample. Columns 2 and 4 of Table 2 reveal that
the majority of ﬁrms selling each product are, in fact, CNet certiﬁed merchants. No-
tice that, for 23 of 35 products, the average list price charged by certiﬁed merchants is
greater than the average list price charged by non-certiﬁed merchants. These simple
averages might lead one to conclude that certiﬁed merchants are able to charge a pre-
mium price relative to non-certiﬁed merchants. An unmatched two-sample t-test of
mean list prices, however, reveals that the average list price of certiﬁed merchants is
statistically greater, at the 5 percent level, for only 8 of the 36 products. Thus, despite
merchants’ best eﬀorts to distinguish themselves by attaining certiﬁed merchants sta-
tus, competition appears to commoditize the markets for many of the products in this
sample. Certiﬁed merchants are able to charge premia on less than one-fourth of the
products in this sample of popular products, and the average diﬀerence (aggregated
17across all products and dates) is less than 2 percent. Comparisons of mean prices
— controlling for shipping costs, inventory, numbers of sellers, and Gomez reviews —
lead to qualitatively similar results. In short, without controls for Red Queen eﬀects,
t h e r ei sl i t t l ee v i d e n c ef o ra n ys y s t e m a t i cd i ﬀerences in prices charged by certiﬁed
and non-certiﬁed merchants.
4 Econometric Analysis and Results
The results presented in Table 2, which suggest that CNet certiﬁed ﬁrms are unable
to charge price premia, fail to account for Red Queen pricing eﬀects. As discussed
above, a ﬁrm that vertically diﬀerentiates in CNet certiﬁcation space is predicted to
be able to charge a price premium when other ﬁr m sa r en o ts i m i l a r l yd i ﬀerentiated
but this premium should evaporate when rival ﬁrms imitate.
To examine these predictions, we ran a series of OLS regressions. In all cases, the
dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the price charged by ﬁrm i for product
k at date t. In each case, we included a binary dummy variable for each product
to control for unobservable product characteristics, and a binary dummy variable
for each date to control for unobservable changes over the 19 month period in such
variables as the number of consumers visiting the Shopper.com site. The results from
these regressions are presented in Tables 3 and 4.
In Table 3, speciﬁcation 1 includes three additional dummy variables. “Logo”
indicates whether the ﬁrm’s name is presented in the form of a logo. Since large
18ﬁrms are more likely to use logos than small ﬁrms, this dummy variable provides
a crude proxy for the impact of ﬁrm size on costs and, thus, prices. As would be
expected, the estimated coeﬃcient is negative and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1
percent level. The estimated value of -.05 means that a ﬁrm displaying a logo, on
average, charges prices that are 5 percent lower than ﬁrms than do not display a logo.
This is consistent with logos being used by larger ﬁrms, which may enjoy lower costs.
The variable “Certiﬁed Merchant” is a dummy variable which takes on a value of 1
if the ﬁrm is CNet certiﬁed and 0 otherwise. Notice that the estimate of -.001 is not
statistically signiﬁcant. Thus, similar to the results summarized in Table 2, CNet
certiﬁcation by itself does not appear to permit a ﬁrm to charge a price premium.
The ﬁnal variable included in Speciﬁcation 1, which is the heart of Red Queen
pricing eﬀects, is a dummy variable “One of 1 CNet Certiﬁed Merchants" which
takes on a value of 1 if ﬁrm i is the only CNet certiﬁed merchant in the market and a
value of zero otherwise. Notice this coeﬃcient is positive and statistically signiﬁcant
at the 1 percent level. The estimated value of .124 means that a ﬁrm that is the
only certiﬁed merchant selling the product charges a price premium of 12.4 percent,
compared to when the ﬁrm is certiﬁed and there are other certiﬁed ﬁrms in the market.
Thus, the ﬁrst speciﬁcation indicates that if a ﬁrm unilaterally diﬀerentiates itself by
becoming CNet certiﬁed, it can charge a substantial price premium — but if other
ﬁrms do likewise, it cannot. This supports the hypothesis that the CNet certiﬁcation
environment at Shopper.com leads to Red Queen pricing eﬀects.
19Speciﬁcation 2 generalizes speciﬁc a t i o n1t oi n c l u d ek dummy variables (k =
1,2,...,9) that take on a value of 1 if ﬁrm i is “One of k Certiﬁed Merchants” selling
the product, and zero otherwise. Again, Logo is negative and signiﬁcant, while the
pure eﬀect of being a certiﬁed merchant does not have a statistically signiﬁcant impact
on price. Notice that this speciﬁcation leads to qualitatively similar results, in that
the premium enjoyed by a certiﬁed merchant ranges from 15.1 percent to 7.9 percent,
depending on whether the ﬁrm is the only certiﬁed merchant or one of 4 certiﬁed
merchants.
Speciﬁcation 3 generalizes speciﬁcation 2 by including ﬁrm-speciﬁce ﬀects to con-
trol for heterogeneities across ﬁrms (such as reputational diﬀerences not captured
in CNet certiﬁcation as well as diﬀerences in costs). Not surprisingly, with these
more general controls, Logo is no longer statistically signiﬁcant, suggesting that it
is a poor proxy for ﬁrm diﬀerences. The general pattern of the other coeﬃcients
is similar to the previous speciﬁcations; diﬀerentiation through certiﬁcation leads to
relatively large premia when only a few ﬁrms are certiﬁed, but virtually no price
premium when multiple ﬁrms are certiﬁed.
Speciﬁcation 4 generalizes speciﬁcation 3 to include controls for market structure
by incorporating dummy variables that control for diﬀerent numbers of sellers regard-
less of certiﬁcation status (up to a total of 9 ﬁrms). This more general speciﬁcation
suggests that diﬀerentiation through CNet certiﬁcation leads to a price premium only
when one or two ﬁrms use the strategy. In particular, when a ﬁrm is the only certi-
20ﬁed merchant, it can charge a premium of 17.2 percent. This premium drops to 9.3
percent when two ﬁrms are certiﬁed, and is not statistically diﬀerent from zero when
three ﬁrms use the strategy.
On balance, the results in Table 3 suggest that a ﬁrm that unilaterally attempts to
diﬀerentiate itself by becoming CNet certiﬁed can charge a substantial price premium.
In contrast, when several other ﬁrms imitate the strategy, each ﬁrm’s ability to charge
a premium is greatly diminished. One deﬁciency in these ﬁndings, however, is that the
econometric results reported in Table 3 do not control for product-speciﬁc life-cycle
and product-speciﬁc market-structure eﬀects. As discussed earlier, product prices
tend to fall during their life cycles, and not all products mature at the same rate. To
the extent that products sold by non-certiﬁed merchants decline more rapidly than
products sold by certiﬁed merchants, the previous results will tend to overstate the
value of diﬀerentiation through CNet certiﬁcation.
To mitigate these potential biases, we also controlled for product-speciﬁcl i f ec y -
cle and product-speciﬁc market structure eﬀects by also running speciﬁcations that
include interaction terms for product and date dummy variables. Eﬀectively, this
controls for product-speciﬁc life-cycle and product-speciﬁc market-structure eﬀects
by accounting for unobservable diﬀerences over time and across products in the level
of competition, desirability of the product to consumers, and so on. These results are
summarized in Table 4.
Notice that in all of the speciﬁcations reported in Table 4, the extra controls
21dramatically reduce the estimated price premium enjoyed by a ﬁrm that unilaterally
adopts the CNet diﬀerentiation strategy. For example, in speciﬁcation 1 we see that
after controlling for product-speciﬁc life cycle and product-speciﬁcm a r k e ts t r u c t u r e
eﬀects, the estimated price premium enjoyed by a ﬁrm that unilaterally adopts a CNet
certiﬁcation strategy is .054. Thus, instead of the 12.4 percent premium reported in
Table 3, the premium drops to 5.4 percent. Notice that the "One of 1 Certiﬁed
Merchant" estimates in Table 4 are much less sensitive to the inclusion of controls for
diﬀerent numbers of certiﬁed merchants (speciﬁcation 2) or controls for ﬁrm-speciﬁc
eﬀects (speciﬁcation 3) than those reported in Table 3. In all cases in Table 4, a ﬁrm
that unilaterally adopts a CNet certiﬁcation strategy charges a premium of about
5 percent, and this premium statistically vanishes when additional ﬁrms adopt the
strategy.
F i n a l l y ,w en o t et h a ta l lo ft h es p e c i ﬁc a t i o n ss u m m a r i z e di nT a b l e s3a n d4e x p l a i n
over 98 percent of the variation in individual ﬁrm prices. While dummies to account
for unobservable ﬁrm heterogeneity and product life-cycle eﬀects together explain
less than 1 percent of the variation in prices, the inclusion of the latter reduce the
estimated premium enjoyed by a ﬁrm that unilaterally diﬀerentiates itself from 15
percent to about 5 percent.
225C o n c l u s i o n
Our major ﬁndings are two-fold. First, regardless of the speciﬁcation, diﬀerentiation
in CNet certiﬁcation space is signiﬁcantly more valuable when a single ﬁrm does so
than when multiple ﬁrms use the strategy; there appear to be “Red Queen” pricing
eﬀects in these data. Second, while our ﬁndings are qualitatively the same with and
without controls for product-speciﬁc life-cycle and product-speciﬁc market-structure
eﬀects, the estimates from the two approaches are quantitatively diﬀerent. Con-
trolling for these eﬀects reduces estimates of the price premium stemming from the
unilateral use of online diﬀerentiation strategies from 15 percent to about 5 percent.
Expressed diﬀerently, our results indicate that ﬁrms competing in highly com-
petitive online markets can mitigate the deleterious eﬀects of price competition by
engaging in vertical diﬀerentiation strategies, but the ultimate value of such strategies
crucially depends on the number of rival ﬁrms that ultimately employ similar strate-
gies. Controlling for product-speciﬁc life-cycle and product-speciﬁc market-structure
eﬀects, our data suggests that a ﬁrm that unilaterally diﬀerentiates itself from its
rivals by participating in CNet’s Certiﬁed Merchants program can charge a 5 percent
price premium. However, when other ﬁrms imitate this strategy, the price premium
vanishes. More generally, our results indicate that in examining the eﬃcacy of dif-
ferentiation and reputation-enhancing strategies in online markets, it is important to
control not only for the number of ﬁrms using similar strategies but also for product
life cycle and market structure eﬀects.
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25.68               128.36 $         
(6.99)                       (5.99)                      
25.16               218.29            
(7.16)                       (6.60)                      
2.33                 620.61            
(1.15)                       (13.07)                    
16.35               134.01            
(9.08)                       (3.89)                      
12.50               580.90            
(11.03)                     (16.78)                    
17.60               172.78            
(17.99)                     (5.82)                      
2.63                 153.28            
(2.62)                       (4.43)                      
4.50                 202.20            
(7.68)                       (11.87)                    
13.53               198.84            
(15.21)                     (29.91)                    
14.75               343.31            
(12.98)                     (91.54)                    
8.33                 54.55              
(2.81)                       (8.59)                      
23.42               54.86              
(11.96)                     (9.29)                      
14.82               149.30            
(18.22)                     (26.60)                    
31.00               146.22            
(17.54)                     (29.82)                    
31.32               131.05            
(7.82)                       (2.41)                      
5.33                 27.73              
(6.53)                       (10.92)                    
10.77               209.63            
(13.13)                     (7.41)                      
28.47               60.00              
(7.02)                       (2.23)                      
1.25                 145.35            
(0.50)                       (44.81)                    
25.87               56.76              
(12.04)                     (1.85)                      
7.47                 214.23            
(5.64)                       (8.15)                      
49.47               752.17            
(12.32)                     (53.79)                    
4.47                 70.66              
(3.20)                       (4.64)                      
12.16               661.23            
(9.51)                       (97.00)                    
14.00               268.96            
(12.69)                     (18.71)                    
4.07                 68.64              
(3.90)                       (2.17)                      
9.86                 218.84            
(10.47)                     (20.53)                    
15.56               215.82            
(13.11)                     (50.97)                    
9.00                 207.34            
(9.45)                       (33.17)                    
15.17               232.39            
(18.66)                     (22.24)                    
27.63               322.35            
(17.12)                     (19.33)                    
24.00               53.34              
(14.80)                     (2.11)                      
24.37               24.10              
(11.11)                     (7.43)                      
18.05               21.10              
(7.46)                       (4.38)                      
1.00                 76.69              
-                           (16.78)                    
10.81               18.55              
(10.62)                     (1.40)                      
* Standard errors in parentheses.
3Com Homeconnect 488 19
ADOBE ACROBAT V4.0 478 19
ADOBE PHOTOSHOP V5.0.2 28 12
ATX MBD 278 17
CASSIOPEIA E-105 125 10
Creative Labs 3D Blaster RIVA TNT2 Ultra 176 10
Creative Labs Blaster CDRW 4224 21 8
Creative Labs CDRW 6424 45 10
Creative Labs PC-DVD Encore 6X 203 15
Creative Labs PC-DVD RAM 5.2GB 236 16
Creative Labs Sound Blaster Live Value 150 18
Creative Labs Video Blaster WebCam 3 445 19
Diamond Viper V770 Ultra 163 11
EpsonStylus Color 740 527 17
FRONTPAGE 2000 595 19
HALF LIFE 80 15
HP CD-Writer Plus 8200i 140 13
INTELLIMOUSE EXPLORER 541 19
Intel Create & Share Camera Pack USB 5 4
MONEY DELUXE 2000 388 15
Matrox Millennium G400 MAX 112 15
Nikon Coolpix 950 940 19
OFFICIAL RED HAT LINUX V6.0 76 17
Olympus C-2000Z 231 19
Olympus D-340R 238 17
PAINT SHOP PRO V5.0 61 15
PENTIUM III 450 138 14
PENTIUM III 500 249 16
Palm III 90 10
Palm IIIx 273 18
Palm V 525 19
QUICKEN DELUXE 2000 408 17
STAR WARS EPISODE I: RACER 463 19
STAR WARS X-WING ALLIANCE 343 19
UPGRADE WINDOWS 98 3 3
VIRUSSCAN CLASSIC V4.0 173 16












19.63           6.05             128.16 $           128.10 $      
(6.41)                (2.84)                (5.89)                      (7.47)                
21.32           4.06             216.41              227.51         
(6.44)                (2.01)                (6.58)                      (12.92)              
2.25             1.00             620.50              635.00         
(1.22)                -- (12.96)                    --
13.82           2.69             135.78              130.97         
(8.23)                (2.24)                (5.80)                      (6.14)                
10.60           3.80             581.98              564.23         
(9.72)                (1.92)                (16.59)                    (11.53)              
14.10           5.00             175.15              166.77         
(15.85)              (3.37)                (8.92)                      (9.32)                
3.00             1.00             154.13              151.95         
(2.76)                -                   (5.94)                      -                   
4.10             1.33             203.30              191.35         
(7.46)                (0.58)                (12.19)                    (11.40)              
12.00           3.18             203.54              197.80         
(13.90)              (2.44)                (12.45)                    (35.18)              
11.31           4.23             327.81              395.76         
(10.48)              (4.23)                (85.54)                    (135.55)            
6.94             2.29             54.05                58.55           
(2.36)                (0.99)                (9.90)                      (12.70)              
19.94           5.58             55.40                54.86           
(8.12)                (3.34)                (9.61)                      (9.78)                
13.70           4.33             147.10              155.90         
(17.44)              (3.01)                (27.09)                    (8.63)                
23.76           7.24             140.58              157.59         
(13.74)              (5.55)                (35.01)                    (34.28)              
25.53           5.79             130.50              133.23         
(6.71)                (3.22)                (2.52)                      (3.41)                
7.25             1.47             36.59                27.41           
(7.46)                (0.74)                (3.32)                      (10.59)              
9.33             3.11             211.61              198.69         
(12.36)              (3.26)                (8.29)                      (14.49)              
22.84           5.63             60.20                58.78           
(6.40)                (2.50)                (2.08)                      (4.85)                
1.33             1.00             157.26              109.63         
(0.58)                -- (46.49)                    --
20.80           5.43             56.83                55.98           
(9.65)                (3.52)                (2.18)                      (2.84)                
6.14             2.17             214.24              214.22         
(5.20)                (1.27)                (8.63)                      (11.10)              
30.68           18.79           760.85              736.66         
(10.25)              (7.08)                (49.51)                    (51.29)              
3.88             1.25             71.33                61.47           
(3.06)                (0.46)                (4.71)                      (14.80)              
8.25             5.50             728.29              607.64         
(9.39)                (3.38)                (69.08)                    (107.07)            
9.64             6.06             280.38              263.51         
(11.57)              (4.25)                (18.15)                    (18.18)              
3.53             1.33             68.49                70.96           
(3.68)                (0.52)                (2.12)                      (2.62)                
7.93             2.45             215.26              232.78         
(10.05)              (1.92)                (19.96)                    (44.12)              
13.67           3.14             219.79              215.76         
(12.05)              (2.18)                (51.46)                    (44.76)              
8.00             3.00             215.14              198.35         
(9.07)                (2.10)                (20.24)                    (42.49)              
14.13           3.59             238.75              226.56         
(16.29)              (4.65)                (19.15)                    (27.75)              
22.12           7.84             319.43              324.25         
(12.82)              (5.59)                (19.38)                    (18.41)              
19.82           5.46             53.44                51.18           
(11.98)              (3.45)                (1.62)                      (9.11)                
19.26           6.06             24.11                25.27           
(8.42)                (3.43)                (7.59)                      (7.53)                
14.53           4.19             20.40                24.51           
(5.63)                (2.14)                (4.40)                      (4.26)                
1.00             -                   76.69                --
-                   -- (16.78)                    --
7.88             3.92             18.64                17.74           
(9.00)                (3.32)                (1.37)                      (2.15)                
S.E. in parentheses.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
*** H0: µcertified merchant - µnon-certified merchant = 0 vs. HA:µcertified merchant - µnon-certified merchant  > 0
***










3Com Homeconnect 0.4895             
ADOBE ACROBAT V4.0 0.9989             
ADOBE PHOTOSHOP V5.0.2 --
ATX MBD 0.0137              **
CASSIOPEIA E-105 0.0264              **
Creative Labs 3D Blaster RIVA TNT2 Ultra 0.0405              **
Creative Labs Blaster CDRW 4224 0.2796             
Creative Labs CDRW 6424 0.0802              *
Creative Labs PC-DVD Encore 6X 0.2871             
Creative Labs PC-DVD RAM 5.2GB 0.9443             
Creative Labs Sound Blaster Live Value 0.8618             
Creative Labs Video Blaster WebCam 3 0.4351             
Diamond Viper V770 Ultra 0.7712             
EpsonStylus Color 740 0.9190             
FRONTPAGE 2000 0.9960             
HALF LIFE 0.0138              **
HP CD-Writer Plus 8200i 0.0090              **
INTELLIMOUSE EXPLORER 0.1234             
Intel Create & Share Camera Pack USB --
MONEY DELUXE 2000 0.1881             
Matrox Millennium G400 MAX 0.4981             
Nikon Coolpix 950 0.0740              *
OFFICIAL RED HAT LINUX V6.0 0.0092              **
Olympus C-2000Z 0.0003              **
Olympus D-340R 0.0077              **
PAINT SHOP PRO V5.0 0.9819             
PENTIUM III 450 0.9014             
PENTIUM III 500 0.4122             
Palm III 0.1597             
Palm IIIx 0.0820              *
Palm V 0.7752             
QUICKEN DELUXE 2000 0.1619             
STAR WARS EPISODE I: RACER 0.6737             
VIRUSSCAN CLASSIC V4.0 0.0942              *
STAR WARS X-WING ALLIANCE 0.9956             
UPGRADE WINDOWS 98 --Dependent Variable: Natural Log of List Price
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Logo -0.050 (9.45) *** -0.050 (9.54) ** 0.000 (0.02) 0.000 (0.05)
Certified Merchant -0.001 (0.19) -0.007 (1.66) * 0.003 (0.53) 0.006 (1.13)
One of 1 Certified Merchants 0.124 (6.74) *** 0.151 (7.95) *** 0.153 (8.66) *** 0.172 (3.56) ***
One of 2 Certified Merchants 0.144 (6.72) *** 0.157 (7.56) *** 0.093 (3.44) ***
One of 3 Certified Merchants 0.096 (4.52) *** 0.100 (4.92) *** 0.034 (1.34)
One of 4 Certified Merchants 0.079 (4.76) *** 0.088 (5.64) *** 0.040 (1.99) **
One of 5 Certified Merchants 0.003 (0.19) 0.008 (0.47) -0.028 (1.47)
One of 6 Certified Merchants 0.001 (0.09) 0.006 (0.44) -0.015 (0.99)
One of 7 Certified Merchants 0.036 (2.20) ** 0.030 (1.97) ** 0.020 (1.19)
One of 8 Certified Merchants 0.019 (1.11) 0.016 (1.10) 0.013 (0.84)








Robust t-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level
Table 3: Determinants of Individual Firm Prices: Regressions without Controls for Product-Specific Life-Cycle/Market-Structure 
Effects
t-Statistic























0.98Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Logo -0.048 (12.77) *** -0.048 (12.74) *** 0.000 (0.04) 0.000 (0.04)
Certified Merchant -0.001 (0.25) -0.002 (0.41) 0.006 (1.36) 0.006 (1.36)
One of 1 Certified Merchants 0.054 (1.77) * 0.055 (1.78) * 0.052 (1.94) ** 0.052 (1.94) **
One of 2 Certified Merchants 0.028 (0.87) 0.002 (0.09) 0.002 (0.09)
One of 3 Certified Merchants -0.030 (0.73) -0.052 (1.53) -0.052 (1.53)
One of 4 Certified Merchants 0.034 (0.84) 0.016 (0.48) 0.016 (0.48)
One of 5 Certified Merchants 0.009 (0.28) -0.012 (0.48) -0.012 (0.48)
One of 6 Certified Merchants -0.018 (0.86) -0.033 (1.8) * -0.033 (1.8) *
One of 7 Certified Merchants 0.030 (0.99) 0.007 (0.27) 0.007 (0.27)
One of 8 Certified Merchants 0.001 (0.06) -0.004 (0.22) -0.004 (0.22)









Robust t-statistics in parentheses








Specification 1 Specification 2
Dependent Variable: Natural Log of List Price
Specification 3
0.98 0.98 0.99
9435 9435 9435
NN N
Y
9435
0.99
Specification 4
t-Statistics
Y
Y
Y
Y